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Populism and the 2016 American election:  
Evidence from official press releases and Twitter 
 
 
 
Populism is a widely used label for a diverse group of political parties and movements 
around the world. Researchers have applied it equally in political analyses of the far-right 
politics in Western and Eastern Europe, leftist movements in Latin America, and movements 
like the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street in North America. Commentators have used it 
extensively to describe recent events, from the Brexit referendum to the victories of far-right 
parties in Poland and Hungary and the popularity of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 
recent election.  
Electoral campaigns are fertile grounds for the promotion of populist ideas and, the 
American election of 2016 is no exception. In this context, Donald Trump has been labelled ‘the 
populist par excellence’ (Oliver and Rahn 2016). Comparative analyses of announcement 
speeches during the electoral campaign show that Sanders has relied more on a critique of 
economic elites, while Trump has used simple rhetoric of anti-elitism, nativism and economic 
insecurity to make a strong populist claim to the presidency (Oliver and Rahn 2016). By 
addressing the economic and cultural concerns of the white working class and their declining 
societal position, the political rhetoric Trump used in his campaign speeches contributed to his 
success (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017).  
Rovira and Kaltwasser (2018) makes important headway in measuring populist rhetoric 
across the political spectrum in the 2016 campaign, through a content analysis of the campaign 
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speeches of main presidential candidates (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018).  They find 
that, compared to levels of populism in Greece and Venezuela, populism in the US election was 
moderate, with Sanders and Trump engaging in such discourse with different levels of 
consistency (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018).   
These studies have significantly improved our understanding of how political candidates 
make use of populist rhetoric in their electoral campaigns. Yet, we still have much to learn about 
the role that different forms of formal campaign communication played in promoting populist 
ideas on both sides of the political spectrum in the 2016 American election.  
This paper seeks to make a twofold contribution to this research agenda. First, it draws 
on the literature on populism as a category of rhetorical claims and proposes a typology of 
populist claims we expect to find in contemporary American politics. Second, it tests empirically 
whether this typology holds in the case of the 2016 election, by identifying specific themes that 
could inform populist rhetoric on both sides of the political spectrum. It offers fresh evidence 
from a textual analysis of official campaign communication through Twitter and press releases 
by the top three presidential candidates – Hilary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump.    
 
What is Populism? 
 
Scholars across the social sciences have engaged in debate regarding the nature of populism and 
whether it is a form of political mobilization (Jansen 2011; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Weyland 
2001) an ideology (Mudde 2007), or a type of discursive frame (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016; 
Hawkins 2009; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Poblete 2015; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Despite 
important differences separating these traditions, scholars agree on many fundamental features 
of populist movements.  
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At its core, populism is a type of political rhetoric predicated on the moral vilification of 
elites, who are seen as self-serving and undemocratic. Ultimately, populism proclaims the 
existence of a crisis caused by elites, seeking to challenge the dominant order and giving voice 
to the collective will (Moffitt 2015; Oliver and Rahn 2016; Pappas 2012; Rooduijn 2014). 
Regardless of their ideological preferences, populists promise to replace the existing corruption 
with a political order that puts the “people” back at its center and resonates with their longings 
and aspirations. Populists consider any claims to economic, political, or cultural privilege 
unfounded and a direct threat to the common wisdom of the “people” (See Bonikowski and 
Gidron 2016; Hawkins 2009; Kazin 1995; Lee 2006; Panizza 2005; Stanley 2008; Rooduijn 
2014; Taggart 2000). Mueller (2016) proposes a set of necessary conditions to ascertain 
whether populism exists: (1) anti-elitism that reaches beyond simple opposition to incumbent 
parties; (2) anti-pluralism that provides a credible justification of the ‘us-them’ distinction 
within a particular society; and (3) the adequate socioeconomic situation with large gaps 
between groups.  
Right-wing populists view of the “people” is often infused with nationalism and nativism. 
The “people” are pure and share an identify through belonging to one nation, or “heartland” 
(Taggart 2000), from which minorities and immigrants are often excluded (Bonikowski 2017; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Seen as the silent majority whose interests are overlooked 
in favour of arrogant economic elites, corrupt politicians and minorities (Canovan 1999), the 
“people” are promised a return to an imagined golden age of racial and ethnic purity, unlimited 
prosperity and protection from self-interested politicians.  
Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) find that, in electoral campaigns, candidates who see 
themselves as political outsiders are more likely to rely on populist claims. They often employ a 
distinctive rhetorical style that is emotional, simple, direct, and often indelicate (Canovan 1999; 
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Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Moffitt and Tormey 2014). Their lack of decorum and 
predilection toward flaunting the usual rules of authenticity makes them appear authentic and 
different from a “typical politician.” The transgressive political style signals to their supporters 
a strong commitment to protect the interests of their voters, even if it requires breaking the 
rules (Oliver and Rahn 2016).  
Historically, in the US populism is a common feature of presidential politics among both 
Democrats and Republicans and, in general, is a strategic tool of political challengers, 
particularly those who have legitimate claims to outsider status (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). 
Despite discursive similarities across the political spectrum, ideology does influence the claims 
that populist politicians seek to advance. While recent studies have shed light on important 
dimensions of populism in the 2016 election, we are only beginning to understand the complex 
circumstances that rendered populist rhetoric appealing to American voters in the most recent 
election.  
Drawing from the relevant literature, in Table 1 we propose a typology of attitudes that 
we expect contemporary Democratic and Republican politicians to advance when they make a 
populist claim to political leadership in contemporary US. On the left side of the ideological 
spectrum, populists make use of language that is hostile to the rich, financial elites, and big 
corporations (Plattner 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017). They advance an agenda inclusionary of the Main Street and opposed to Wall 
Street, with a progressive social justice agenda (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). In general, 
populist politicians on the left tend to rely primarily on economic claims, while politicians on 
the right favor nationalist claims (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016).  
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On the right side of the ideological spectrum, populist discourse is producerist and 
denounces out-of-control spending by government that would benefit freeloaders (Zernike 
2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), such as immigrants or members of minority 
communities (Michael 2014). Providing a racialized interpretation of the people, right-wing 
populism is intrinsically exclusionary of cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial minorities 
(Plattner 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Voting preferences in the 2016 have also 
been tied to the timing of the election, at the end Obama’s presidency. Eight years of an African 
American president magnified a process of racialization of politics (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2016). By 2016, political polarization had become increasingly correlated with race and racial 
attitudes, to the extent that the Democratic Party increasingly comprise racially liberal whites 
and minorities, while the Republican Party increasingly comprised people who were 
unfavourable toward African Americans, immigrants, and Muslims (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2016, p. 67). 
The main threat for “the people” is the “liberal elites”, which works through higher 
education, particularly the Ivy League universities, to “pervert” the bureaucrats, judges, and 
politicians of the future with “un-American” ideas (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). 
Consternation over the economy, concomitant with fears of demographic displacement due to 
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widespread immigration – mainly from Latin America – has stoked up the resurgence of populist 
attitudes on the far-right (Table 1). How does this distribution of rhetorical claims map onto the 
official communication of the top 2016 presidential hopefuls?  
 
Populism in the 2016 American election 
 
To address the above question, we propose a study of official campaign communication through 
Twitter and press releases. The analysis focuses on official campaign statements 
(www.hillaryclinton.com; www.berniesanders.com; www.donaldtrump.com) as well as tweets 
published on the official accounts of the three main candidates to the US election: @Hillary 
Clinton, @BernieSanders, @realDonaldTrump. Historical campaign statements and tweet data 
were collected from the three candidates’ webpages and from www.twitter.com, for a period of 
six months (1st January – 30th June 2016). Official campaign statements are published on 
campaign websites. Twitter is a social networking platform that allows users to post microblogs, 
or brief entries (“tweets”) that are no longer than 140 characters and usually contain “(…) short 
content such as phrases, quick comments, images, or links to videos” (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 
2013, p.219). Since its launch in 2006, numerous politicians have made increasing use of it for 
campaigning purposes (see for instance Obama’s use of Twitter during both presidential 
campaigns). In the Appendix, we provide details about the method and the coding process, 
including information about validity, inter-coder reliability, the coding scheme, and the 
frequency of codes for populist themes for each candidate. 
Our justification for selecting the two means of communication is twofold. First, we seek 
to respond to a recent call for more research in the role that media, including social media, play 
in the process of vote choice (Ernst, Engesser, and Esser 2016; Groshek and Koc-Michalska 
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2017). The comparative perspective across the two media will allow us to notice differences and 
similarities in campaign discourse for mainstream media, targeted by official press statements, 
and social media, through Twitter. Second, we selected Twitter for the analysis of social media 
use, as the platform has been found to be a crucial factor for explaining Trump’s political rise 
and victory (Galdieri, Lucas, and Sisco 2018). We seek to explore further whether Twitter, 
alongside press releases, has also been a medium to disseminate populist messages during the 
2016 electoral race.  
 
Broad comparative patterns   
 
Descriptive statistics of Twitter use and the release of official campaign statements to the press 
via the campaign websites show clear trends in prevalence of either medium of communication 
for the three candidates (Table 2).  
Hillary Clinton’s campaign used official press releases as vehicles for presenting different 
aspects of her policy agenda and positioning it as a continuation of the main policies 
implemented by the Obama administration and in opposition to the Trump and Sanders future 
legislative proposals and political direction. The Clinton campaign made use of Twitter to 
promote messages that are very similar in nature to the ones promoted in the official 
statements, covering a wide range of topics and taking clear positions on a large number of 
issues (Tables 3-4 in Appendix). A better-known political candidate on the national political 
scene, the Clinton campaign chose to make relatively less quantitative use of press releases and 
tweets. Qualitatively, however, her campaign covers the widest spectrum of topics and issues, 
representing her as a candidate with extensive political and policy experience.  
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Table 2: Descriptive user statistics for online campaigns 
 
Candidate Hillary Clinton Bernie Sanders Donald Trump 
Press releases  
(total)1 
 
112 
 
270 
 
130 
Tweets  
(as of 25 June 2016) 
 
6,212 tweets 
 
8,896 tweets 
 
32,000 tweets 
Twitter followers 
(as of 25 June 2016) 
 
7.12 million 
 
2.66 million 
 
9.33 million 
Average words in coded 
press releases 
 
445 
 
390 
 
339 
 
The Sanders campaign made significantly more use of official campaign statements, to 
disseminate information about Sanders’s main policy positions and public campaigning efforts 
(Tables 3-4 in Appendix). Sanders’s statements during the six months covered by this study are 
more than double in number and, on average, considerably longer than the ones issued by the 
other two candidates. By comparison to the use of lengthier press releases to communicate with 
the public and the media, his campaign’s use of Twitter is more limited. Arguably one of the 
main goals of the Sanders campaign was to disseminate as much information as possible about 
a less well-known presidential candidate and thus they used press releases as the main medium 
for written communication (Table 2). 
 Trump’s use of press releases stands in contrast with Sanders’s, as the campaign issued 
a much lower number of statements that often contain one paragraph alone with an official 
acknowledgment of support from public figure. A very limited number of official press 
statements include detailed descriptions of policy proposals. His use of Twitter contrasts both 
qualitatively and quantitatively with the other two candidates’ communication strategies. 
Trump made much more extensive use of this medium to reach out to voters and also had over 
30% more followers than Hillary Clinton and close to 60% more than Sanders. Trump’s tweets 
                                                                    
1 All press statements that are coded are linked to more than one code. Given that the Hilary Clinton campaign did 
not date their press releases, all press released published on the official campaign website were coded. The press 
releases included in this study for Sanders and Trump are the ones published during January-June 2017. 
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are predominantly critiques, often virulent, of other candidates and much less of a platform to 
promote policy positions. In other words, the minimal use of press releases allowed Trump to 
limit the public’s access to clear and elaborate policy positions as well as strategies to implement 
them in the event of a successful election result. By favouring Twitter use, his campaign limited 
communication to short and direct statements that favour personal opinions over official policy 
positions and strategies.  
 
Populist rhetoric in the 2016 presidential campaigns 
 
The qualitative content analysis finds that the distribution of themes clusters populist discourse 
along the left-right axis of ideological position, with Trump’s statements and tweets displaying 
similarities to the political discourse of the far right. Trump’s discourse in the Twitter-sphere 
during the electoral campaign shows rhetorical elements of populist right-wing ideology 
(Figure 3). The nativist dimension of Trump’s campaign narrative, seen as the clear need to 
strengthen American protectionism in the face of national security threats such as terrorism, 
migration, and Islam more broadly, is clear in the most prevalent themes amongst the codes 
with the highest frequency. While not consistently opposed to all types of immigration, Trump 
makes very clear his strong opposition to the integration of illegal migration. Stricter controls 
on migration flows, through legislation, a migration ban, and a wall along the border with 
Mexico, are essential components of what he considers a sound national security that 
safeguards against terrorism, job loss and crime.  
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Figure 3 
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big corporations, and the Washington establishment (Figure 2). Similar to Clinton’s campaign 
(Figure 1) and broadly in line with the Democratic Party’s agenda, gun control and an open 
domestic integration policy toward immigrants are also relevant issues in Sanders’s campaign. 
Sanders explicitly calls for a socialist revolution and speaks on behalf of one main excluded 
social group, namely “the poor.” They represent a broad social category whose exclusion is 
coordinated by Wall Street and corporations, which pursue their financial self-interest and exert 
significant influence over the political elites in Washington. Moreover, the poor and excluded 
are victims of unfair income distribution and a system that favours the rich over the poor.  
While Clinton ties income and wealth inequality to differential taxation of the rich and 
the poor, Sanders proposes a broader narrative of exclusion that is tied to systemic deficiencies 
in contemporary US. Poverty and inequality, as central themes in Sanders’s campaign, are best 
explained by the convergence of a number of social and economic factors orchestrated by Wall 
Street, big companies, and the Washington elites. The solutions to these problems are also 
structural and would require profound change in political values, leading to a dramatic social 
and systemic transformation. Free education and universal healthcare would allow everyone 
access to quality education, regardless of income, race, immigration status, or gender. On the 
international dimension of foreign policy, Sanders’s Twitter discourse proposes the wide use of 
diplomatic partnership, limiting and aiming to eliminate the use of military power as a response 
to international conflicts and terrorism (Figure 2).    
 
Conclusion 
 
2016 has been called “the year of the populist” and Donald Trump, “its apotheosis” (Oliver and 
Rahn 2016: 190). This study provides new empirical evidence that this is indeed the case. It 
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offers an analysis of official campaign discourse in the official statements and tweets of the top 
three candidates to the US presidency in 2016 and shows that a systematic engagement with 
official campaign press releases and Twitter identifies the occurrence of populist discourse in 
the 2016 election. 
All candidates promoted a populist discourse in their campaigns, with which they 
identified in varying degrees during the period included in this study. Trump’s campaign was 
nativist, producerist, and critical of the political liberal elites in Washington. It promoted a 
racialized view of “the people” and necessarily excluded illegal migrants, Muslims, refugees, and 
other minorities from his electoral agenda. Sanders’s campaign makes use of populist rhetoric 
in line with left-wing ideology. He views “the people” as poor, largely ignored by the Washington 
political elite and doomed to a life of inequality by the self-servient economic elite making up 
the richest 1% of the population. Inclusive of immigrants as well as other social, cultural and 
religious minorities, Sanders advances a more radical view of a socialist state that offers all its 
citizens free education and healthcare, eradicating poverty and inequality. Clinton makes 
relatively limited use of populist discourse in her campaign, and the occurrence of populist 
terms is largely linked to offering responses to the two counter-candidates. Instead, her 
campaign’s agenda is inclusive of minorities, focused on the middle class, and liberal in focus, 
positioning itself as continuing the legacy of the Obama presidency. 
 We have sought to contribute to existing scholarship on populism as political discourse, 
by exploring the main necessary conditions for populist rhetoric and by testing them on original 
textual data. Although additional analysis is undoubtedly needed to understand fully the factors 
that contribute to the public appeal of populist discourse, our data illuminate important 
patterns about the use of official campaign communication to advance populist claims in the 
presidential campaigns of 2016 American election.  
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